Forfatterens kommentarer

Christian Lund:
"Den historiske forklaring - kausal eller intentionel?"

The paper intends to discuss the relationship between historical causal explanations and historical explanations of an intentional character. This is primarily done through an intellectual historical analysis of the discussion between philosopher of science Carl Gustav Hempel and philosopher of history William Dray in the period 1940-60. It is shown how Hempel via his "covering-law model" asserts a concept of causality which is based on Humes theory of regularity, and that he - as a consequence of this and because of his background in the ideal of unified science belonging to logical positivism - rejects any concept of causality which is detached from a regular connection. In this connection the paper will present a more pragmatic and non-positivist concept of causality as an alternative to Hempels causal explanation. It is shown how Dray, with his background in an idiographic understanding of the subject of history, critizises Hempels model, claiming that according to the methods of history it is impossible to make general laws which will cower both a specific historical event and other similar situations. Next the paper will analyse how Dray advances the rationel explanation as a historical explanation. Both Hempels concept of causality based on the theory of regularity and Drays rationel explanation are discussed in relationship to actual praxis by historians, and in this connection it is stressed that both concepts of explanation may be problematic when put in relationship to historical methodological praxis. Besides the paper discusses whether intentions or motives can act as causes - which Dray does not deny. Through a short introduction of Donald Davidsons philosophical theory of action it is made plausible that motive explanations can be reinterpreted as causal explanations. At last the papers suggests that both types of explanation - both the causal and the intentional one - are indispensable in the historians praxis. As earlier mentioned, a more pragmatic adoption of the causal explanation is suggested than the one Hempel allows because of his logical-positivist background.